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FORUM JURIDICUM
THE FIRST TWO YEARS AFTER SHAFFER
V. HEITNER
John R. Leathers*
When I first read the advance sheets on Shaffer v. Heitner' in
the summer of 1977, my life as a Civil Procedure teacher flashed
before my eyes. I could vividly remember all the happy moments
experienced while teaching the subject-students terrified by Pen-
noyer v. Neff,2 devastated by Harris v. Balk.' How could I ever
replace those wonderful times with the modern, virtually colorless
logic of Shaffer? In a state of grief and panic, I did the only thing
any self-respecting law teacher would do-I wrote a law review arti-
cle' about Shaffer and considered its effects on my existing casebook
and notes. A cursory examination of the law review treatment of
Shaffer indicates that other procedure teachers decided to pursue
the same course. In a way, Shaffer was like the death of an old fami-
ly member who had suffered long enough to make other family
members miserable. Everyone working in the procedure area knew
that Harris and the philosophy of Pennoyer were overdue for extinc-
tion, but it was still a shock when it really happened.
During the past two years, it has been possible to accommodate
the curriculum to Shaffer with virtually no changes other than its
addition. Pennoyer must still be taught, since its holding that the
due process clause' sets the limits of state adjudicatory authority is
still perfectly sound. Even Harris remains to illustrate the workings
of quasi in rem jurisdiction, although use of such jurisdiction on
similar fact patterns is clearly disallowed by Shaffer.' All of that is
easy enough for those who must fit Shaffer into the law school cur-
riculum. However, the question which seemed open was how those
practicing law were accommodating Shaffer. I found one law review
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.B.A. 1968, Univer-
sity of Texas at El Paso; J.D. 1971, University of New Mexico; LL.M. 1973, Columbia
University. The author notes with gratitude the research assistance of Ms. Connie
Sellars.
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
4. Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 66
Ky. L.J. 1 (1977).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6. 433 U.S. at 208.
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article' surveying some post-Shaffer case law; but it did not touch on
some of the areas which interested me, so I decided to explore a bit
further. This article is a compilation of what my research turned up
in the fall of 1979.
What follows is a survey of the cases touching on the problems
raised by Shaffer during the first two years after the decision. The
survey is broken down into the areas which seem to have arisen
most frequently. Before beginning the analysis, I would like to make
some general observations.
The most surprising aspect of the post-Shaffer cases is what is
not there. Any case important enough to engender so much discus-
sion and such a torrent of literature in scholarly circles would be
expected to produce a similar amount of case law from the lower
courts. That simply is not true of Shaffer. For the most part, lower
courts are not having the difficulty with Shaffer that scholars have
had. Scholars may argue that the lower courts are unable to grasp
the many subtle nuances of Shaffer. In my view, it is the courts
which are dealing well with the problems and the scholars who have
made too much of the case. The one thing which clearly emerges
from the case law subsequent to Shaffer is that quasi in rem
jurisdiction survives in a variety of situations. Since there is no way
to compare the number of pre-Shaffer attachments with the number
of post-Shaffer attachments, it is not possible to tell from this
survey what quantitative effect Shaffer has had. From a scholarly
view Shaffer may seem most important because it overrules Harris,
but I doubt that there has been much practical impairment. It has
been my unscientific observation over the years that practicing
lawyers seldom used the Harris procedure, even when faced with
fact patterns in which the procedure would have been helpful. In
part I suspect the neglect of the Harris procedure has been caused
by the failure of most lawyers while students really to understand
Harris, resulting in their avoidance of the technique after entering
practice. Despite this, I believe that even after Shaffer, quasi in rem
jurisdiction remains an important tool to those who can use it.
Part IV of the Shaffer opinion concluded that the exercise of
jurisdiction by Delaware (regardless of how labeled) was violative of
due process As I discussed at length in a previous article,' that con-
clusion could only be justified on one of two grounds: (1) Either
Delaware lacked minimum contacts to exercise constitutionally in
7. Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner: Holding, Implications, Forebodings, 30 HAST.
L.J. 1183 (1979).
8. 433 U.S. at 216.
9. Leathers, supra note 4, at 20.
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personam jurisdiction or (2) in personam jurisdiction is constitu-
tionally required in all cases. At the time I doubted that either was
true, and lower court decisions since Shaffer bear out that conclu-
sion. With respect to the ability of a state to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over directors of a corporation created by the law of the
state for damage to the corporation, I agree with Justice Brennan
that such jurisdiction does exist." Since Shaffer, the court of appeals
of North Carolina has upheld such jurisdiction over a non-resident
director in a shareholders' derivative suit in Swenson v. Thibaut." It
thus appears that what was lacking in Shaffer could not have been
minimum contacts between the defendants and the forum.
Lower court decisions since Shaffer also clearly show that the
contention that in personam is the only form in which a state may
constitutionally exercise jurisdiction is not true. In at least five
cases, courts have struck down exercises of quasi in rem jurisdiction
because the defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the forum to
satisfy due process. On the other hand, there are at least eight
instances in which courts have upheld such exercises of jurisdiction
on the grounds that the defendant did have sufficient contacts to
satisfy the due process standards."3 This means that if the state has
a long arm statute which will reach the facts in question and the
defendant has sufficient contacts to satisfy due process, jurisdicition
may be exercised either quasi in rem or in personam. The continued
availability of quasi in rem is of particular importance in cases in
which the state long arm statute is not sufficiently broad to reach
the facts at hand, but the facts fall within the constitutional limits of
due process. Illustrating such a use of quasi in rem jurisdiction are
the cases of Intermeat Inc. v. American Poultry Inc."' and Drexel
10. 433 U.S. at 222 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11. 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978).
12. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. v. GAC Properties Credit, Ltd., 389
A.2d 1304 (Del. Ch. 1978); Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick & Co. Ltd., 96 Misc. 2d
808, 409 N.Y.S.2d 581; Nemestky v. Banque de Developpment de la Republique du
Niger, 64 A.D.2d 694, 407 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1978); Balcon Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322,
244 S.E.2d 164 (1978); C.O.W. Inc. v. Motor Vehicles Div., Oregon Dep't of Transp., 37
Or. App. 73, 586 P.2d 107 (1978).
13. Intermeat Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc. v D'Angelo, 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Marketing
Showcase Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 445 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Feder v.
Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Has-
ty, 360 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1978); Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick & Co. Ltd., 67
A.D.2d 321, 414 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1979); Gro-Mar Public Relations Inc. v. Billy Jack Enter-
prises, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 673, 245 S.E.2d 782 (1978); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v.
Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
14. 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. DAngelo."5 The fact patterns in both
cases fall within the constitutional limits of due process but outside
the reach of state statutory long arm jurisdiction. This means the
states could have constitutionally utilized in personam jurisdiction
but instead used quasi in rem jurisidiction to supplement their long
arm statutes. It is crucial to note that the proper focus in such cases
is on whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum
to meet the constitutional test for in personam jurisdiction. This
clearly seems to be what is required by Shaffer. Despite that, Judge
Tenney in Marketing Showcase Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co." focused
erroneously on the defendant's having sufficient contact to activate
the state long arm statute." Although the result reached by Judge
Tenney was correct since the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
was upheld, this erroneous focus on the outer limit of such jurisdic-
tion as statutory rather than constitutional will restrict its use. This
will keep the state from exercising jurisdiction in excess of its long
arm statute and will limit all exercises of jurisdiction to the state's
statutory authorization. It appears that even after Shaffer the
choice of which form its jurisdictional exercise should take is still up
to the state so long as the constitutional limit of due pro-
cess-minimum contacts-is not exceeded.
If the lower courts have rejected, as I believe they have, both of
the possible bases on which the final holding in Shaffer could have
been justified, then a strange result is seen. The opinion of Justice
Brennan, despite having been both a concurring opinion and a
dissenting opinion, emerges from the case as controlling. That
development is not particularly offensive, since he had no quarrel
with the majority regarding the requirement that all exercises of
jurisdiction be bounded by the due process standards previously
applied only to in personam jurisdiction. Indeed, lower court opin-
ions are encouraging, since Justice Brennan's treatment of the facts
in Shaffer made more sense than the majority's. All of this,
however, must be small comfort to the plaintiffs in Shaffer who had
their action ordered dismissed by the Supreme Court. Subsequent
case law in the lower courts indicates a unanimous feeling that the
Shaffer dismissal was incorrect despite the case's laudable
philosophical position. At least the error of that dismissal has
caused no similar mistakes in subsequent litigation in the lower
courts, so far as I was able to discover.
It is also clear that attachment has survived in the lower courts
for non-jurisdictional purposes. I once feared that courts might not
15. 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
16. 445 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
17. Id. at 759.
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carefully consider the jurisdictional nature of the attachment in
Shaffer and that attachments for other purposes might be impaired.
Subsequent developments have shown that fear to be ill-founded. In
Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Uranex,'8 an attachment was
upheld pending the outcome of litigation in personam in a proper
forum elsewhere. That approach was rejected by Judge Tenney's
second opinion in Marketing Showcase Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co.19
The case began as a quasi in rem action; after 5haffer was decided
it was allowed to continue as an in personam action. This is the only
case which arguably could indicate that quasi in rem jurisdiction has
been totally displaced by in personam jurisdiction. It arguably sup-
ports such a premise because the court did not allow the case to go
forward quasi in rem despite the existence of long arm jurisdiction.
Disallowing quasi in rem in the first proceeding was followed in the
second by the dissolving of the attachment. The attachment was not
even allowed to continue while the in personam litigation was pro-
ceeding in that very court. Dissolving the attachment was as erro-
neous as the initial conversion of the action from quasi in rem to in
personam. It cannot be said that the concept of attachment for
security purposes pending litigation is unknown in our legal system.
Although many cases have questioned the procedure by which such
attachment may take place and although the Supreme Court has
placed restrictions on such procedures,"0 not one of those cases has
ever questioned the basic premise'that attachment for security pur-
poses is allowable under proper procedures. Attachment for security
pending litigation in a proper forum does not raise the same sort of
hostage-holding image as attachment for jurisdictional purposes in
cases like United States Industries, Inc. v. Gregg.2" In seeking the
attachment, the plaintiff is in no way seeking to compel the defen-
dant to litigate in an improper forum to save his property; the plain-
tiff merely seeks to have property against which execution can be
had in the event a recovery is ordered by the proper forum. The
control of Shaffer over quasi in rem jurisdiction has absolutely
nothing to do with these security attachments, which by definition
are not made for jurisdictional purposes. Even if Shaffer has some
sort of bearing, it could at most be said that any attachment must
meet some type of fundamental fairness test. I see nothing fun-
damentally unfair about such an attachment pending litigation in
18. 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal: 1977).
19. 457 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
20. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mit-
chell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
21. 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976).
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personam in a proper forum and suggest that the history of the
Supreme Court's treatment of replevin indicates that this conclusion
is correct.
Lower courts have also had no trouble concluding that the
restrictions of Shaffer have no applicability to attachment as used to
execute upon judgments. This is not surprising in view of Shaffer's
clarity on that point.2 As far as the lower courts are concerned, it
makes no difference whether the prior judgment sought to be execu-
ted upon was rendered by a court of a sister state or of a foreign
country. Of course, the execution of any of these judgments can be
resisted upon any of the grounds normally allowed for collateral
attack of judgments. If there is no ground for collateral attack, then
nothing in Shaffer should be read as restricting attachment for exe-
cution purposes. The absence of grounds for a collateral attack
means such judgments have been rendered in a manner consistent
with due process. Since Shaffer was designed to prevent attach-
ments in fact patterns violative of due process, it should not hamper
execution of a judgment which has been rendered consistently with
due process.
Since the historical roots of in rem jurisdiction are in the area of
admiralty law, it is not surprising that lower federal courts have
recently struggled with the issue of the effect of Shaffer on the use
of in rem jurisdiction in admiralty practice. Two cases" have taken
the absolute position that Shaffer has nothing to do with attach-
ments under the admiralty practice of the federal courts. On the
surface, that is an attractive argument. Shaffer, by its nature, placed a
restriction on the power states could exercise under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. That holding is not binding on
federal practice in admiralty since the fourteenth amendment by its
clear terms does not apply to the federal government. However, this
is not to say that Shaffer has no bearing at all on attachments in
admiralty practice. Shaffer does more than articulate the effect of
the fourteenth amendment on attachments. It also rejects the
philosophical ideas of Harris concerning indirect effects versus
direct effects and substitutes in its place a realistic analysis of con-
nections with the forum by the person whose property has been
attached. That new philosophy seems applicable whether the
authority being exercised has its roots in state power (Shaffer) or in
22. 433 U.S. at 210-11 n.36.
23. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation,
459 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp.
Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
24. Rule B of the Admiralty Rules authorizes such attachments.
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federal power (admiralty). The federal system has a due process
restriction placed on it just as the state system does, although the
source of that restriction is the fifth amendment rather than the
fourteenth. Therefore, any attachment in admiralty ought to be sub-
ject to the same minimum contacts analysis as attachment under
state law.
While the two situations should be subject to the same sort of
analysis, there will be significant differences in the focus of that
analysis. Attachment in Shaffer cases depends on minimum contacts
between the defendant and the forum state. Attachment in admir-
alty cases depends on minimum contacts between the defendant and
the United States. This was the approach taken by the federal
district court in Engineering Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene.25 It is
not proper to rest the outcome of such analysis on the authorization
for attachment in Admiralty Rule B. No one would argue that such
authorization could stand against the contrary mandate of the fifth
amendment. At the same time, it would be inappropriate to make
the validity of such a federally authorized procedure depend on
whether a defendant had minimum contacts with any particular
state. The admiralty forum exercises jurisdiction not on behalf of a
state but in order to effectuate national policies. The exercise of
that jurisdiction should be measured against minimum contacts with
the nation rather than with any one state.
One surprising area of Shaffer-related difficulty encountered by
the lower courts is divorce. Over the years the Supreme Court has
had difficulty characterizing the exact nature of divorce
jurisdiction." As discussed at length in Williams v. North Carolina,27
there are some aspects of a divorce proceeding which resemble an in
personam proceeding and others that seem more nearly in rem or
quasi in rem. However the proceeding is characterized, it seemed
long since settled by Williams that a state which was the domicile of
one of the parties to a marriage had the ability to dissolve the mar-
riage without having jurisdiction over the absent spouse. Of course,
any difficulty in this area caused by Shaffer must occur in the ex
parte setting, since such problems cannot be envisioned where both
parties are subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The interests
articulated in Williams of the domicile in dissolving the marriage
seem clearly sufficient to survive any reading of Shaffer. The
results in lower courts since Shaffer indicate that this conclusion is
correct, but at least two courts have thought the issue sufficiently
25. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
26. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
27. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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doubtful to take some time dealing with it. Interestingly, those two
courts took very different approaches to justify the continued
availability of ex parte divorce. The Missouri Court of Appeals in
deciding In re Marriage of Breen28 characterized ex parte divorce
proceedings as either in rem or quasi in rem. The court did not
explain what effect Shaffer has if the proceeding is so characterized,
but the holding in favor of jurisdiction clearly indicates that no
change in the traditional position was made.
A more reasoned opinion on this issue was given by the Indiana
Court of Appeals in deciding In re Marriage of Rinderknecht.9 The
court recognized that after Shaffer all exercises of jurisdiction must
be measured against the minimum contacts test of due process. It
concluded that the residency of one of the parties was a sufficient con-
tact. In characterizing the proceeding as in rem, the court took the posi-
tion that a dissolution petition was a claim arising from the res (the
marriage) and that the presence of one party to the marriage made
the res present within the jurisdiction of the court. It seems,
however, that the better solution to the entire problem would simp-
ly be to ignore it. From cases like Shaffer and Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,"0 I conclude that the label attached to a
jurisdictional exercise is meaningless. Instead of making Shaffer the
test for determining the jurisdictional power of the state to grant an
ex parte divorce, the better solution would be to look upon Williams
as setting the jurisdictional ability for such cases. Given the fun-
damental state interests in such proceedings identified by Williams,
such an exercise of jurisdiction would not be affected by Shaffer.
Williams was not based on the sort of conceptual fictions which
characterized Harris. The realistic analysis of Williams is in line
with Shaffer in refusing to base jurisdiction on a label of some sort
or on whether the absent spouse has minimum contacts. It would be
better to look on the ex parte divorce as a proceeding sui generis
authorized by Williams due to the practical necessities of providing
a forum for divorce when the defendant spouse is absent and
unavailable. If it helps to think of this as a case of jurisdiction by
necessity, then that is possible; but it adds nothing. Simply, jurisdic-
tional authority comes from Williams, and it would take a clear in-
dication in Shaffer that any change has been made in that authority.
I see nothing in Shaffer to so indicate.
Although Williams may furnish the jurisdictional authority for
ex parte divorces, states have no authority to determine property
28. 560 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. App. 1977).
29. 367 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. App. 1977).
30. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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disputes in such cases. Indeed, the cases make it quite clear that to
settle the property disputes of the parties, the court must have in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant." Under prior views of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, it was possible for a forum hearing an ex
parte divorce also to make a division of property subject to the
attachment jurisdiction of the forum. Lower courts are now begin-
ning to struggle with the effect Shaffer has on that use of quasi in
rem jurisdiction. Missouri has taken the position that in such
divorce proceedings there is quasi in rem jurisdiction to determine
the rights of both parties to property located within the forum.2
The logical justification for such jurisdiction is Type One quasi in
rem jurisdiction, which was said in Shaffer to be unaffected by the
new restrictions.33 To reach that conclusion, the claim being asserted
must arise from the property. In that event, the state would have
sufficient contacts to adjudicate the rights of the absent party in the
property. The question remaining is whether the claim in the
divorce proceeding regarding property does in fact arise from the
property. The Missouri Court of Appeals in Chenowith v.
Chenowith" took the position that when an absent spouse acquires
property within the state, he is purposefully availing himself of the
protection of the forum. That ruling echoing Hanson v. Denckla35
was used to conclude that the absent spouse was sufficiently con-
nected to the state to allow jurisdiction to settle the conflicting
claims to the marital property. The simpler justification would have
been to say that the claim the resident spouse had against the prop-
erty arose in a manner more related to the attached property than
did the type of unconnected Harris-claim condemned in Shaffer."
While the claim is not as directly related to the property as a
damage claim arising from injuries suffered on the property or as a
specific performance suit on a sales contract, it seems that the con-
flicting claims of the spouses are sufficiently connected to the prop-
erty itself to justify jurisdiction. This is certainly true regarding
property acquired by joint efforts during the marriage. The connec-
tion as to property separately owned prior to marriage or separ-
ately acquired during the marriage is more tenuous. In those cir-
cumstances the resident spouse would probably be trying to enforce
31. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
32. Chenowith v. Chenowith, 575 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. App. 1978); In re Marriage of
Breen, 560 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. App. 1977).
33. 433 U.S. at 208.
34. 575 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. App. 1978).
35. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
36. This is the conclusion reached by North Carolina in Holt v. Holt, 41 N.C. App.
344, 352, 255 S.E.2d 407, 412 (1979).
19801
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
an unadjudicated support, alimony, or maintenance obligation
through non-marital property. Since such an obligation cannot be ad-
judicated without in personam jurisdiction, neither can it be ad-
judicated through a jurisdictional attachment on separate property.
Missouri did not face this particular problem, since the property in-
volved was marital property.
One of the issues left open by Shaffer was whether a Harris
attachment might still be allowed in a case in which the defendant
lacked minimum contacts with the forum but in which no other
forum was available to the plaintiff. 7 For the fact pattern in which
the plaintiff is a resident of the forum, the position that such an at-
tachment is valid was taken in Louring v. Kuwait Bolder Shipping
Co."8 In Louring a Connecticut resident was allowed to attach a debt
owed by a Connecticut corporation to a Kuwait corporation lacking
the minimum contacts with Connecticut necessary for the constitu-
tional exercise of in personam jurisdiction. The district court in
upholding the attachment acted on the assumption that the defen-
dant was not constitutionally subject to in personam jurisdiction in
any of the fifty states, yet at the same time the court indicated that
the activities of the defendant had given it fair warning that it
might be subject to suit somewhere in the United States. 9 These
two positions are contradictory. It is difficult to tell from the spotty
facts outlined by the court, but the conclusion that no other forum is
available in the United States seems quite suspicious. The court at
one point stated:
Even if the defendant could be more substantially "found" in
another state, there is no unfairness in calling upon a foreign
corporation to defend in Connecticut to the extent of a debt
accruing in Connecticut. A Kuwait corporation cannot claim
disadvantage in defending in Connecticut rather than some
other state."
That statement must be incorrect. The thrust of that portion of the
opinion is the exact philosophy rejected by every single member of
the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer. These comments are
not to take issue with the proposition that Harris attachments
might still be valid in cases where no other forum is available, but
simply to question the validity of the conclusion in Louring that no
other forum was available. The observation of the district court
about a connection between the defendant and the United States,
37. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
38. 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977).
39. Id, at 633.
40. Id.
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coupled with the language as to the defendant being "more substan-
tially found," leads me to suspect that another forum may have been
available in the United States. Having failed to drop the Harris
philosophy as required by Shaffer, the district court did not search
too hard for an alternate forum. However, I must admit that the
facts are too skimpy to enable me to convert my suspicion into a
conclusion. Even if no other forum is available in the United States,
would that justify a Harris attachment or should the plaintiff be left
to assert his claim in personam in a foreign country? It is not
unknown for the federal courts to dismiss cases based on forum non
conveniens when the only other available forum is in a foreign coun-
try." If a court may so decline to exercise its legitimate jurisdiction,
how can jurisdiction seemingly as odious as a bare Harris attach-
ment be justified on the grounds that without such an attachment
the plaintiff will have to proceed in a foreign country? The position
of Shaffer dealing with the "no other forum" problem ought to be
taken literally. The district court in Louring seems to have taken
"no other forum" to mean "no other forum in the United States."
Taking the Shaffer language literally means that such cases would
be limited to those in which no other forum was available anywhere,
and Harris attachments would not be allowed in cases in which
there is a foreign, but no other United States, forum available.
The total number of cases treating all these various aspects of
Shaffer does not equal the number of cases dealing with the effect
of Shaffer on the attachment technique embodied in Seider v. Roth.'
I will not undertake an extended discussion of the merits of the
attachment of liability insurance by a forum in which the tortfeasor
cannot constitutionally be subjected to in personam jurisdiction. It
is sufficient to say that the technique has been very controversial
since New York first began to use it. This has always seemed a
tempest in a teapot, since so few states ever chose to use the pro-
cedure. As I previously noted elsewhere, 3 the constitutionality of
the procedure was perceived to rest at least in part on the con-
tinued validity of Harris."
As predicted, lower courts since Shaffer have had to reevaluate
Seider. Because the technique is used more in New York than in any
other state, New York courts have borne the brunt of this litigation.
The results of that New York litigation are very interesting. In the
supreme court (New York's trial court) five cases have evaluated the
continued validity of Seider. Interestingly, in four of those deci-
41. See, e.g., Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1960).
42. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
43. Leathers, supra note 4, at 31.
44. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
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sions"5 courts took the position that Seider is invalidated by Shaffer;
only one decision at that level held that Seider survives.46 The two
appellate division cases took the position that Seider survives. 7
Finally, the court of appeals took the position that Seider survives
Shaffer.8 A split of authority arose in the federal District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, with one district judge holding
that Seider survives,49 while another district judge took the position
that Seider was overruled by Shaffer. ° The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that Shaffer does not invalidate Seider5 Thus,
the two highest courts in New York, the New York Court of
Appeals, and the second circuit agree that Shaffer does not invali-
date Seider.
Outside New York, authorities are split. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court held in Rocca v. Kenney52 that such attachments are
no longer permitted due to the restrictions of Shaffer. A similar con-
clusion was reached by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Belcher v.
Government Employees Insurance Co.5" Minnesota was the only
state to follow New York in allowing such attachment procedures to
continue. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld such an attachment
in Savchuk v. Rush."4 The Savchuk decision was particularly signifi-
cant, since the case had been remanded to Minnesota by the United
States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Shaffer.
The final chapter in the controversy has now been written by
the United States Supreme Court in its decision in Rush v.
Savchuk 5  Reviewing the Minnesota Supreme Court decision
upholding the validity of the attachment procedure, 56 the Supreme
Court held that the Seider attachment violates the substantive due
process requirements of Shaffer.57 The Court's conclusion is interest-
ing because it rejects the conclusion of the Minnesota Supreme
45. Attanasio v. Ferre, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1977); Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92
Misc. 2d 454, 40 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d
412 (1977); Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977).
46. Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1978).
47. Erneta v. Princeton Hospital, 66 A.D.2d 669, 411 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1978); Alford v.
McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1978).
48. Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808, 383 N.E.2d 110 (1978).
49. O'Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
50. Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Caterpillar, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
51. O'Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978).
52. 381 A.2d 330 (N.H. 1977).
53. 387 A.2d 770 (Md. App. 1978).
54. 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
55. 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
56. 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
57. 100 S. Ct. at 579.
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Court that such an attachment is the functional equivalent of a
direct action against the insurer. The first basis of the rejection is
questionable at best. The Court noted that:
The State's ability to exert its power over the "nominal defen-
dant" is analytically prerequisite to the insurer's entry into the
case as a garnishee. If the Constitution forbids the assertion of
jurisdiction over the insured based on the policy, then there is
no conceptual basis for bringing the "garnishee" into the
action.58
This analytical approach to the problem elevates form over
substance. If the overall effect is no more than to create a direct
action against the insurer, it is difficult to see any constitutional dif-
ficulty simply because the internal steps in arriving at that end are
inconsistent. If it is the state's position, as was the Minnesota posi-
tion in Rush, that a direct action has been created, it is impossible
to ascertain what authority the Supreme Court has to second-guess
the methodology so long as the end result is permissible. It is
crucial to note that at no point in the decision does the Court even
hint that a state could not allow a direct action against a non-
resident's insurer in an action by a resident plaintiff on a claim aris-
ing outside the forum. As long as that possibility remains, as Mr.
Justice Stevens indicates that it does, 9 and the majority fails to
question that proposition, the decision of whether to implement that
state power through judicial or legislative methods seems to be
within state control. The part of the Court's decision in Rush that is
at least arguable is that portion which questions whether a Seider
attachment really is only the functional equivalent of a direct action.
In considering the problem of potential adverse effects of such
an attachment on the tortfeasor "defendant," the Court accepted the
premise that such an action would limit liability to the policy limits
and that the defendant would suffer no personal liability. It might
be added, although the Court did not so note, that fact findings in
the attachment trial would not be given collateral estoppel or res
judicata effects against the nonresident "defendant.""0 Despite this,
the Court found that, as a practical matter, a defendant might suffer
some effects from such actions. In malpractice actions commenced
by attachment, the Court said the action would cast doubt upon the
defendant's integrity, competence, and professional standing."1 What
58. M at 578.
59. 100 S. Ct. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. These limitations are discussed in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106,
110-112 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Rush v. Savchuk, 272 N.W.2d at 892; Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 234 N.E.2d 669 (1967).
61. 100 S. Ct. at 579 n.20.
1980]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
this possibility has to do with the constitutionality of an attachment
in an automobile accident case is not readily apparent. The Court
further noted that a defendant's insurability might be affected by
such an attachment proceeding or, in cases of attachments in more
than one state, multiple plaintiffs might claim in excess of policy
limits. 2 The idea of claims in excess of limits is a fanciful objection.
If the policy limit is $10,000 and judgments of that amount are given
in a dozen different states in favor of a dozen different plaintiffs, not
a single one of those recoveries could ever be executed against the
tortfeasor defendant. Even if the Court assumed that the real ob-
jection is that, when sued in personam, the defendant will no longer
have any protection, the objection still is invalid. Surely the Court
would not deny that the defendant would be entitled to offset
against the judgment in the in personam action any amount already
recovered by the plaintiff quasi in rem. I simply do not see how the
Court can conclude that the defendant has substantial economic in-
terest in such attachment litigation. As for the insurability argu-
ment, one could equally theorize that insurability would be affected
by the victim's merely filing a claim with the insurer prior to the fil-
ing of any litigation. There is nothing to support the Court's conclu-
sion but the bare assertion that filing suit may affect insurability. I
see nothing in the Court's analysis to justify its conclusion that the
interests of the defendant are not de minimis. My feelings about the
interest of the defendant tortfeasor are shared by Justices Brennan
and Stevens in their dissent written by Mr. Justice Stevens. 3
It seems the Court is clearly correct in concluding that the form
of quasi in rem involved in Rush is that type in which the claim does
not arise from the property itself." As noted previously, I reject any
such analytical approach and would simply characterize the attach-
ment as a direct action. The Court is also correct in rejecting any
temptation to say that the insurer's contacts with the forum can be
used as contacts for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over
the insured tortfeasor." In considering the possibility of in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the insured, it is worth noting that the
Court adheres to the "power" line of cases on in personam jurisdic-
tion in requiring contacts with the defendant rather than focusing
on the plaintiff or the claim.6
62. Id.
63. 100 S. Ct. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. 100 S. Ct. at 578.
65. 1d.
66. This line includes Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and Kulko v.
Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The Court further adhered to that
emphasis in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), which
was decided the same day as Rush.
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My differences with the Court concerning the use of Seider
attachments after Shaffer could be expanded greatly beyond the
above treatment, but I suspect the whole thing is not worth the
effort. The Court is right because it is final, if I might borrow a
phrase. Since the use of Seider was always such a small minority
position, the effects of the holding in Rush will not be widespread.
At least this loose end, which caused the bulk of the cases dealing
with Shaffer, has now been settled.
On the whole, it appears that the lower courts are having less
trouble with the United States Supreme Court decision in Shaffer
than might have been predicted. It also seems that the portions of
Shaffer which originally caused me some misgivings are simply
being ignored by the lower courts. The holding in Shaffer could
have been justified only by a preference for in personam jurisdiction
being exercised in all instances or by a conclusion against state con-
trol over corporate directors. It is clear from the subsequent lower
court decisions that neither is being followed. What is left of Shaffer
is its philosophy, which was set forth better in the concurring and
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan than in the majority opinion.
All jurisdictional exercises must now meet the basic fairness test of
due process-that is the bottom line of Shaffer. It was a philosophy
long coming to attachments. Maybe it is not really so surprising that
courts are applying the standard without serious difficulty. Perhaps
the ease of acceptance indicates just how overdue the change really
was.
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